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Abstract
We explore the long run impact of policy on the level of economic activ-
ity through changes in the vintage distribution of capital, in a model where
di¤erent vintages coexist in production. Because rms can choose the vintage
of capital in which they invest, investment subsidies do not in general a¤ect
the vintage structure of capital. In contrast, vintage-specic taxes or subsidies
that target the newest vintages of capital can signicantly a¤ect output and
welfare in the long run, mainly downwards.
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1 Introduction
An extensive literature investigates whether productivity improvements are embod-
ied in capital, in a debate known as the "embodiment controversy." On the one hand,
recent developments in theory and in data have increased the popularity of vintage
capital models due to their ability to account for US growth and their implications
for industry dynamics.1 At the same time, the policy implications of the hallmark of
these models that new vintages of capital are more productive than old vintages 
have not been widely explored. This neglect is important: Denison (1964) argues in
an oft-quoted comment that the embodiment controversy is unimportant precisely
because it is not policy-relevant. The argument is that policy would have to induce
permanent and unrealistically large changes in investment rates to signicantly skew
the productivity prole towards newer, more productive vintages of capital.
A key assumption underlying this argument is that all investment must take place
in capital of the latest vintage. This assumption is a feature of most vintage capital
models, see the survey in Jovanovic and Yatsenko (2013). However, allowing invest-
ment in vintages of capital other than the latest is essential for matching the gradual
di¤usion patterns widely observed in empirical studies on innovations see Griliches
(1957) and Gort and Klepper (1982) among others. If agents may invest not just in
the latest vintage of capital but in capital of earlier vintages either through the
production of new capital goods of an older vintage, or through purchases or imports
of used goods then aggregate investment rates and the productivity distribution
of capital become uncoupled. As a result, if agents choose which vintage of capital
to invest in, policy may a¤ect aggregates through the productivity distribution of
capital even if investment rates are held constant.
This paper explores the policy implications of capital-embodied technical progress
in a model where investment is allowed in any current or past vintage of capital.
1See Johansen (1959), Solow (1960) among others for early contributions, as well as Hercowitz
(1998) and Boucekkine et al (2011) for more recent reviews. Greenwood, Hercowitz and Krusell
(1997) and Cummins and Violante (2002) argue that models where the productivity of investment
improves over time can account for a large share of US economic growth. Samaniego (2010) provides
key evidence based on rm dynamics.
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Specically, we study the impact of vintage-specic taxes and subsidies, which may
distort the agents decision regarding the choice of vintage. The model is a version of
Jovanovic and Yatsenko (2013, henceforth JY13), extended to allow for such trans-
fers. We select this model because it is a suitable workhorse for studying di¤usion
patterns: it allows di¤erent vintages of capital to coexist in the production function
through imperfect substitution, and it displays the well-known feature of gradual
di¤usion curves for new capital goods, as identied in the empirical literature.
The key ingredient of the model, as in Chari and Hopenhayn (1991), is that there
is a distinction between the date at which a particular capital good is produced and
the vintage of the technology embodied within. Consider the example of operating
system software, and assume for simplicity that all computers use Windows operat-
ing systems. Windows 7 was introduced in 2009, but Microsoft continued to supply
Windows XP , and rms could acquire newly produced copies of the older operating
system for some years.2 Moreover, rms that did purchase Windows 7 might do so
without necessarily replacing their computer hardware of an older vintage. The rea-
son why the ability to invest in capital of an older vintage is important for the policy
implications of vintage capital is that, as Denison (1964) observes, if all investment
is only in the newest vintage then the only channel through which policy can impact
aggregates is through changes in net investment rates. In this example, this would
amount to forcing rms which buy a new operating system to buy Windows 7. In
contrast, if investment does not necessarily have to be in the newest vintage, then
expenditure on operating systems is no longer tied to expenditure on the newest op-
erating systems. As a result, even without changes in investment rates, there could
be a signicant impact of policy on output and welfare in a vintage capital world if
policy can skew the vintage composition of investment.3 Of course investment rates
2The software example is also useful because Windows XP was subject to several free updates
and improvements gradually over time, a feature captured in the model and interpreted as a com-
ponent of "learning". It is this "learning" which leads to the gradual adoption of newer vintages.
The presumption in a vintage capital model would be then that Windows 7 is more productive than
Windows XP , conditional on similar updates and learning.
3Intuitively, if the technology for producing capital increases everywhere at a rate , but in one
country policy induces investment to occur on average in vintages of capital that are s years older
than in another, yet the investment rate is the same, then GDP would be s   lower in the rst
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may also be a¤ected by policy, so a contribution of the paper will be a quantitative
assessment of the impact of policy on aggregates in general equilibrium, as well as
an assessment that abstracts from changes in investment rates.
The policies we examine are vintage-specic taxes and subsidies. We show ana-
lytically that the vintage distribution is insensitive to transfers that are not vintage-
specic, so that blanket investment subsidies have no impact on aggregates through
the vintage distribution. Then, we analyze the impact of policies that di¤erentially
subsidize (or tax) the newest year of capital vintages. We analyze the long-run im-
pact of such policies on allocations, via their impact on the stationary equilibrium.
In order to focus on the impact of changes in the vintage distribution on aggregates
we analyze two types of inter-vintage transfer schemes: (1) where there are no net
subsidies to capital, and separately (2) where transfers to capital are such that there
is no impact on aggregate investment.4 The structure of the exercise is similar to
that in Restuccia and Rogerson (2008), who assess the impact of policies that re-
sult in intra-rm resource reallocation by means of rm-specic transfer schemes. In
contrast, our focus is on the vintage distribution.
We nd that subsidies to new vintages nanced out of taxing older vintages are
detrimental to welfare and to GDP in the long-run. In the calibrated economy, a 20
percent subsidy to investment in the newest vintage leads to a decline in consumption
in each period of 1 percent, a 50 percent subsidy lowers consumption by 5 percent,
and a 100 percent subsidy lowers consumption by fully 18 percent. Moreover, this
impact is not due to any inherent waste in the tax system: these results are for
transfer schemes such that there are no net transfers to or from the capital goods
sector. We obtain similar results when the transfer scheme is designed to ensure
that there is no impact of aggregate investment: thus, these e¤ects are entirely
due to distortions in the vintage composition of investment. The conclusion is that
policy-induced distortions to the vintage distribution can have signicant impact
country than in the second at all dates. Since in principle s is unbounded, factors that a¤ect the
average vintage of capital used could lead countries to di¤er in terms of income by a signicant
amount.
4It turns out that results are similar, because the net transfers required to keep aggregate
investment constant are small.
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on welfare. Since this impact is potentially large, the paper identies an as yet
unexplored channel whereby policy, nancing frictions or other distortions might
lead to di¤erences in macroeconomic outcomes among developed and developing
economies a channel that can only be studied in a model where technical progress
is at least partly embodied in capital.
Section 2 discusses the literature. Section 3 describes the economic enviroment
and solves for equilibrium. Section 4 calibrates the model and reports the results
of quantitative policy experiments. Section 5 concludes with suggestions for future
work.
2 Motivation and Literature
Denison (1964) argues that the existence (or not) of capital embodied technical
progress is not important for policymakers, because unreasonably large changes in
the age structure of capital would be necessary for policy to signicantly inuence
aggregates. Much of the related literature has focused on assessing whether produc-
tivity improvements in capital are an important factor of growth (e.g. Hulten (1992),
or Greenwood et al (1997)), without addressing this key criticism: that an important
factor in evaluating the usefulness of vintage capital models is the assessment of the
policy-relevance of changes in the vintage distribution of capital.
Assessing the impact of policy on the vintage distribution requires a model which
accounts for basic properties of the vintage distribution of capital. First, di¤erent
vintages must coexist in production. Second, the model should reproduce basic
features of the vintage distribution in particular, the slow di¤usion of new capital
goods. Third, as a result, the model should allow investment to occur not just in the
latest vintage of capital, but in older vintages too. This feature requires a distinction
between the age of a capital good and its technological vintage. For example, while
technological progress implies that the most powerful computer available improves
over time, computers of lesser power continue to be produced, using other than the
latest processors. A consequence is that, even if investment rates do not change
over time or are unresponsive to the policy environment, the technological vintage
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of the capital created via investment could be responsive to policy. The productivity
distribution of capital could change signicantly in terms of technological vintage,
even in the absence of changes in investment rates.
Most vintage capital models are inadequate for performing this assessment. The
reason is that most models either assume that all investment occur in the newest
vintage of capital, or they assume that there is a choice of vintage but the optimal
choice is always the newest.5 Instead, this paper adopts the framework recently
introduced in JY13. In this framework, as in Chari and Hopenhayn (1991), invest-
ment may in principle occur in any current or past vintage of capital. The reason
agent nd it optimal to do so is that di¤erent vintages are imperfect substitutes in
production. The gradual di¤usion of new capital goods is achieved via the introduc-
tion of vintage-specic learning, which accumulates gradually over time. The model
is simple and easily mapped into the data typically used in calibrating models in
the related literature a feature that will be important for generating quantitative
results.
Before specifying the details of the model, we ask: is there any evidence that there
do exist di¤erences in the vintage distribution of capital around the world? This is
hard to determine if we take seriously the distinction between the age of capital and
the vintage of the technology used to make it. However, the motor vehicle industry
stands out as one where this distinction may not be so critical. Motor vehicles are
often produced with a vintage attached to them, and in all countries the existence of
an active secondary market for motor vehicles implies that there is a choice between
new and old vehicles, including to some extent imported used vehicles.6 There is of
course signicant heterogeneity among vehicles of similar vintage: for example, the
quality di¤erences between a 2017 Toyota Corolla and a 2017 Ferrari F12 are not
just related to their vintage, and this heterogeneity could hamper inference about
the productivity of capital based solely on measured vintages.7 However, this should
5See the survey in JY13.
6Most countries impose some limits on the ability to import used vehicles, although these tend
to be weaker for commercial vehicles, see US Department of Commerce (2015).
7This need not be a problem in principle, since the di¤erence we are interested are between a
2017 Toyota Corolla and a 2007 Toyota Corolla, but in practice we want to know that di¤erences in
6
be less the case for vehicles used in public transport. This is what we focus on, using
data provided by the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE).
The advantage of using European data is that the existence of open markets implies
that the second hand market among the countries in the data is relatively uid, so
there is easy access to vehicles of older vintage in these countries. Figure 1 shows that
the age distribution is generally tipped towards older vintages of public transport
vehicles in lower income countries, where income is measured using GDP per capita
(PPP adjusted) in 2012, as reported by the World Bank. The relationship is strong:
a 100 percent increase in GDP per capita is associated with a fully 11 percentage
point decrease in the share of public transport motor vehicles older than 10 years. We
do not infer from this anything about the particular policies that might either lead
to these outcomes or that might be used to overcome them, although this would be
interesting to study: the observation is simply that vintage distributions do appear
to vary around the world.
age distributions are likely due to di¤erence in vintage composition, not to other sources of quality
di¤erence.
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Figure 1 Share of Motor Coaches, Buses and Trolleybuses at end
2012, by age, in selected countries indicated by ISO codes. The
correlation in the lower panel is   0:67. Sources UNECE, World Bank,
own calculations.
3 Economic Environment
We extend the framework of JY13 to allow for inter-vintage transfer schemes. Con-
sider a continuous time market economy with a population of unit mass. Each agent
is endowed with a unit ow of labor each date t which they may supply to the labor
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market. Utility is dened over streams of consumption:
U =
Z 1
0
c1 t   1
1   dt, c : R
+ ! R+: (1)
There is a production technology that produces a nal good yt, which can be
used for consumption or for investment. The production function is:
yt = K

t N
1 
t ,  2 (0; 1) (2)
where Nt is labor used at date t and Kt is aggregate capital, dened below.
Each date t a new investment technology becomes available, referred to as a
vintage. Agents may invest uvt units of the nal good in producing capital of any
vintage v  t, and there is a stock of capital of any vintage kvt. Aggregate capital is
dened as
Kt =
Z t
 1
At v (zvkvt)
 dv
 1

(3)
where zv is a productivity level embodied in capital of vintage v, and At v is a
learning function associated with capital of age t  v. Parameter  is related to the
elasticity of substitution among vintages: if  is the elasticity of substitution between
vintages, then    1

, or  = 1
1  . The purpose of the learning function (see JY13)
is to capture the empirical fact that new products (including capital goods) tend
to di¤use slowly, so the peak in use of new goods is not until several years after
their introduction, e.g. see Gort and Klepper (1982). If At v were a constant, and
if zv > zv 1 8v (the hallmark of a vintage capital model) then we would have that
kvt > kv 1;t 8v; t.
In what remains of the paper we will assume that As is an increasing function
(As > As 1), and that zv = et.
Notice that learning depends on the age of capital. There are alternative speci-
cations of learning-by-doing technologies, where the learning occurs depending on
past use e.g. Jovanovic and Lach (1989). However the goal of the paper is to es-
tablish that the vintage distribution is sensitive to policy, so the exact form of the
learning function is secondary. The distinction in our context will only be impor-
9
tant quantitatively if learning functions are a¤ected signicantly by vintage-specic
transfer schemes. However, since the learning about a technology is something that
occurs through worldwide use, the actual pattern of the learning function is likely ex-
ogenous to any particular country, especially if the country is small or not producing
a lot of R&D specically in the eld of application of that technology. In any case it
would be interesting in future work to explore the impact of di¤erent determinants
of learning.
The stock of physical capital of any particular vintage kvt accumulates according
to:
@kvt
@t
= uvt   kvt (4)
where  is the depreciation rate and uvt is investment in capital of vintage v. Thus,
the feasibility condition for the economy is
yt  ct +
Z t
 1
uvtdv. (5)
At date 0, the quantity kv0 is given for all v  0 at date zero. It is then straight-
forward to show that (4) implies that
kvt = e
 (t v)xv +
Z t
v
e (t s)uv;sds, v > 0 (6)
kvt = e
 (t v)kv0 +
Z t
0
e (t s)uv;sds, v  0 (7)
where xv is investment in new capital at the moment it was new.
At each date t rms solve:
max
KNt
fyt   rtKt   wtNtg (8)
subject to Nt 2 [0; 1] and the production function.
Example 1 Before closing the model we can use the production technology to ask:
what is the di¤erence in the productivity of 2 economies with a di¤erent vintage
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structure? We have that output is given by:
yt =
Z t
 1
At v (evkvt)
 dv


(9)
Consider any continuous kvt. If there is another economy with a distribution ~kvt
such that
R t
 1 kvtdv =
R t
 1
~kvtdv, where ~kvt rst-order stochastically dominates kvt
in terms of the age of capital, then the economy with ~kvt will have higher output ~yt
than the other, even though the total physical units of capital are the same in both
economies. Indeed, if the dominance is su¢ ciently signicant, there is unbounded
impact that the vintage distribution, even if the savings rate in both economies is the
same. To see this, suppose the distributions kv;t and ~kv+s;t are given, such that kv+s;t
is a downward translation of the distribution ~kv+s;t:
kv;t =
(
0 t  v < s
~kv+s;t t  v  s
Here the distribution of kv:t is the same as ~kv+s;t, so the entire distribution is shifted
down by s. Again, the two have identical mass in terms of raw units of capital.
However, it is straightforward to show that
yt
~yt
= e s
so that, as s ! 1, yt
~yt
! 0. The example shows that distortions to the vintage
distribution can have arbitrarily large impact on aggregates even with constant savings
rates.
3.1 Vintage-specic transfers
Assume there is a tax  (t  v)  1 on investment of age t  v, uvt. Thus instead of
paying 1 for a unit of investment, they pay  (t  v), where  : R+ ! R+ is twice con-
tinuously di¤erentiable. Thus  is a multiplicative price wedge on investment. The
revenues are distributed lump sum to consumers Tt, leading to the budget condition:
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Tt =
Z t
 1
[ (t  v)  1]uvtdv (10)
If  is increasing then newer vintages of capital are favored by the tax system,
through lower taxes, tax rebates, or subsidies. The agents budget constraint is then
ct +
Z t
 1
uvtdv  rtKt + wtNt (11)
3.2 Model Solution
Denition 1 An equilibrium of the model is a set of prices such that, given the
initial condition kv0 (v  0), the agent chooses investment uvt and consumption ct at
each date so as to maximize (1) subject to (3) and (11), rms maximize (8) and the
government satises (10) for all t.
Denition 2 A stationary equilibrium is an equilibrium and an initial condition kv0
(v  0) such that the age distribution of capital is constant over time and the growth
rate of consumption g is constant over time.
We now study some properties of the equilibrium and of the stationary equilib-
rium. All proofs are in the Appendix.
Proposition 1 There exists a unique stationary equilibrium.
First of all, in a model without taxes ( = 1 ), the user cost of capital of any
vintage v is equivalent to r + , and investment will be chosen optimally so as to
equalize this and the marginal product of capital of each vintage v. However, with a
non-trivial tax scheme, the user cost of capital and therefore the marginal product is
a¤ected by the tax scheme in two ways. First, the level of  (v) a¤ects the level of the
user cost of capital. Second, marginal variation in the tax scheme by vintage  0 (v)
also a¤ects the optimal investment rate in each vintage. For example, if there is a
range of v over which the tax rate  (v) is at and then rises rapidly, the marginal
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cost of new capital will be constant and then rise. As the acceleration begins, agents
nd it preferable to invest in the vintage with the low tax rather than the otherwise
very similar vintage with the higher tax rate (or lower subsidy rate). Given the tax
scheme, this investmetn prole is optimal.
Proposition 2 When investment is optimal,
zv y
 

t At vk
 1
vt = (r + )  (t  v)   0 (t  v) : (12)
Proposition 3 kvt = egtt v, where t v depends neither on t nor v independently.
Proposition 4 uvt = egtt v, where t v depends neither on t nor v independently.
A consequence of these results is that capital and investment of any given age s
are a constant share of GDP over time, even if the share of any particular vintage
rises and then falls over time.
Denition 3 The age distribution at date t is dened as the density function:
k^st  kstR1
0
kutdu
stR1
0
utdu
(13)
Having dened this density, we can make two observations about the model econ-
omy.
Proposition 5 A vintage-independent tax or subsidy  (s) =  does not a¤ect the
age distribution.
Proposition 5 has important implications. When the choice of technological vin-
tage is distinct from the date of production, investment taxes (or subsidies) cannot
be justied as policies that stimulate investment in new technology. Since investment
can occur in capital goods produced using a variety of capital producing technolo-
gies, both new and not-so-new, a tax on investment in itself does nothing to skew
the vintage structure of capital.
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Furthermore, there is a sense in which the overall amount of taxes and subsidies
towards or away from capital does not a¤ect the age distribution of capital, the
subject of this paper. Rather, only the relative sensitivity of transfers to the vintage
does. Consider that any vintage-specic transfer scheme  (s) can be formulated as
a prole  (s)   (s), where  () is a relative sensitivity to vintage and  is a
constant related to revenue generation.
Corollary 1 Considering that any vintage-specic transfer scheme  (s) can be for-
mulated as  (s)   (s), the value of the constant  does not a¤ect the age distrib-
ution.
For learning and taxation proles that can be interpreted in terms of rates of
sensitivity to age, we can deliver a further result about the age distribution of capital.
To do so, we consider a special case. Assume that As = es. In this case  > 0 is
a parameter that can be interpreted as a Poisson rate at which agents learn about
di¤erent vintages of technology. Furthermore, assume that  (s) = e!s. Parameter
 captures the overall size of the transfer scheme, and parameter ! 7 0 captures the
rate at which the transfer scheme favors capital of di¤erent vintages, so that higher
! implies relatively higher taxation of old capital (and relative higher subsidization
of new capital). Under this parameterization, taxing new capital relatively less than
the old (i.e., higher !) can be shown analytically to skew the age distribution of
capital towards newer vintages.
Proposition 6 Assume that As = es ( > 0). Consider economies i 2 f1; 2g, such
that  (s) = e!is, and assume that     + !i (1  ) > 0 8i. The age distribution
of capital k^s in economy 1 rst-order stochastically dominates that in 2 i¤ !1 < !2.
Remark 1 When there is no taxation, Jovanovic and Yatsenko (2013) show that
when As = es, if economy 1 has higher , higher  or lower  than economy 2,
then the vintage distribution in 1 rst order stochasically dominates that in 2. The
same holds true in our environment with taxation when  (s) = e!is. However,
since the current paper is concerned with the impact of policy  () on the vintage
distribution, we keep constant technological parameters such as ,  and  in our
thought experiments and numerical experiments.
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4 Quantitative evaluation
4.1 Calibration
We calibrate the model economy in order to perform quantitative policy experiments.
Although the model is formulated in continuous time, we need a unit for measuring
time in order to calibrate parameters in a consistent manner. We measure time in
years. Details of the computational procedure are in the Appendix.
We require functional forms for the tax function  () and for the learning function
A (). For the calibration process we set  (s) = 1, so there are no inter-vintage
transfers, and calibrate the model to US data, which is relatively unregulated and
for which the related literature reports a wealth of relevant data. Later we discuss
the inter-vintage transfer schemes we consider for the policy experiments.
We set As = 1   e s where  > 0. In this way, learning about any particular
vintage is bounded, so sooner or later all vintages become for obsolete for any  > 0.
This implies that investment in the newest vintage utt equals zero, consistent with
the observation that new capital di¤uses gradually rather than exhibiting "jumps".
Later we assess the sensitivity of results to this assumption.
Given these choices of functional form, the parameters to be calibrated are , ,
, , ,  and .
We set  = 0:33, a standard value for the capital share of income. This is
consistent with the idea that the learning is not embodied in the physical capital itself
but in some other resource for example, in the labor that uses the capital, or in the
productivity of the rm that uses the capital as in Samaniego (2010).8 However, for
robustness later we allow for larger values of , which is equivalent to interpreting
"capital" as including other accumulable resources that might embody the learning.
Note that assuming a small value of  is a conservative assumption in the sense that
it limits the impact of changes in the vintage distribution on aggregates. If  = 0,
then capital and the vintage distribution are irrelevant for aggregate outcomes).
Since g = 
1 , allowing for 1:5 percent annual GDP growth as is typically found
8Prots that accrue to entrepreneurs who use their labor to create rms is not capital income,
see Gollin (2002).
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in US data would imply that  = 0:0350. However this number is very elevated
compared to empirical estimates. The reason is that such an approach to calibration
assumes that all growth is due to capital-embodied growth, as in Solow (1960). If
instead we view  as reecting improvements in the marginal rate of transformation
between consumption and new capital goods (including quality improvements to
capital) as in Greenwood et al (1997) and Cummins and Violante (2002) among
others, then we can match  using the growth rate of the quality-adjusted relative
price of capital. Using the values from Greenwood et al (1997) we have that9  =
0:018, so that g = 0:0077. The remainder of growth is due to unexplained technical
progress that is outside the model.10
An important parameter is the elasticity of substitution among vintages . We
set  = 2. JY13 argue that  t 2 based on the estimates of Bahk and Gort (1993) for
just 2 types of capital, new and old. Independently, Edgerton (2011) nds estimates
based on looking at the substitutability between new and old capital, ranging from
1:7 to 10:5 depending on the type of capital, with the estimates clustured towards
the lower range. This implies that  = 0:5. We also examine the impact of larger
values of .
Another key model parameter is the speed of learning . JY13 set  = 0:6 based
on the nding of Bahk and Gort (1993) that most vintage-specic learning appears
to be complete after 6 years.11
Finally, we set  = 0:06,  = :01 and  = 1, all of which are standard values in a
growth accounting context. See Table 1 for all parameter values.
The calibrated model displays reasonable investment behavior. First, in the cal-
ibrated economy, we nd that the investment share of GDP is 18:5 percent. This
is very close to the value in US data, even though this parameter was not directly
calibrated. Also, Figure 2 shows that the di¤usion pattern is an S-shape followed
9This is the average rate across equipment and structures used in that paper.
10If overall growth is 1:5 percent as in JY13, this value of  accounts for 51 percent or about half
of growth. If overall growth is 1:24 percent as in Greenwood et al (1997) then  accounts for about
60 percent of growth, as they nd.
11The value  = 0:6 stems from assuming that exactly 95 percent of the learning is complete by
the 6th year.
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Table 1: Calibration Statistics
Calibration parameters for the benchmark economy. Calibration assumes there are no inter-vintage transfers.
Parameter Interpretation Value
 Rate of capital embodied tech. prog. 0:018
 Capital share of income 0:33
 Physical depreciation rate 0:06
 Cross-vintage substitution elasticity 2
 Discount rate 0:01
 Intertemporal elasticity of substitution 1
 Speed of learning 0:6
by a gentle decline, as found by Gort and Klepper (1982) for a variety of capital
goods. This is due to the initially gradual adoption of each vintage of capital due
to learning, followed by a gente decline as investment shifts towards newer vintages
and the older capital depreciates. The peak in usage is when the capital is about
7 years of age although the peak in investment is much earlier, between the rst
and second year of introduction. This reects the nding of Bahk and Gort (1993)
that vintage-specic learning is in general quite rapid, along with the fact that, in
a relative sense, the learning is counteracted by the advance in the productivity of
newly introduced vintages.
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Figure 2 Investment uv;t and capital stock kv;t based on age t  v in
the calibated model economy, in model units.
4.2 Policy experiments
In the remainder of the paper we focus on inter-vintage policy experiments in the
calibrated economy.
For these experiments, we must choose a specic inter-vintage transfer scheme
 (). We examine the impact of transfers either too or from capital of the "newest
vintage", interpreted as capital produced using technology introduced during the
most recent year.
We choose this transfer scheme for the following reasons. First, Denisons (1956)
criticism conceives of the policy implications of vintage capital models in this fashion,
shifting resources towards the technology of the latest vintage. Second, it is not
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unusual in policy circles to discuss investment tax credits (i.e. subsidies) as being
useful for targeting new technologies. As shown by Propositon 5, an investment tax
credit or subsidy that is not vintage-specic will not a¤ect the vintage distribution,
as rms could write o¤ the tax credit for investment in new capital of any vintage.
However, in practice in the United States investment tax credits are formulated to
promote particular new technologies,12 e.g. the 2009 Car Allowance Rebate System
(known more widely as "cash-for-clunkers"), or the Production Tax Credit adopted in
1992 and the more recent Investment Tax Credit, which are directed at the promotion
of new wind and solar energy investments respectively. Third, Eaton and Kortum
(2001) argue that most countries in fact import much of their capital stock from a
few advanced economies. In those cases, there exists a way for developing economies
to di¤erentially tax new and old capital: by treating new and used capital di¤erently
when it is imported. For example, if it takes a year for capital to signicantly enter
the used capital market, then di¤erential tari¤s on imports of new or old capital may
be equivalent to vintage-specic taxes.13
We examine two types of tax schemes:
 Schemes with no net transfers to or from capital;
 Schemes where net transfers to or from capital are enough to keep aggregate
investment constant.
In our benchmark results, we look at tax schemes such that there are no net
transfers to or from capital, i.e. Tt = 0. The reason we focus on policies with no net
transfers to capital is in order to focus on strictly inter-vintage transfers: the results
using any policy that allows Tt 6= 0 would conate the impact of policy through the
vintage distribution with its redistributive impact.14
12In general the formulation of the Investment Credit (IRS Form 3468) is targeted towards in-
vestments of recent vintage.
13In practice used machinery tends to experience higher trade barriers than new machinery,
including outright prohibition, see United States Department of Commerce (2015) for a global
survey. Some authors such as Soloaga et al (1999) argue that in developed economies the opposite
could be desirable.
14The review in Samaniego (2006a) nds that, at least among OECD countries, there are no net
transfers to or from rms.
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We do so as follows. Let  0 be the tax rate for rms below one year of age. Let
 0 +  diff be the tax rate for rms above one year of age. Then let  diff reects
(in levels) the preferential tax treatment given to newer vintages. The government
budget balance condition would then become
[ 0   1]
Z 1
0
uvtdv + [ diff +  0   1]
Z 1
1
uvtdv = 0. (14)
Given a value of  diff , we can raise or lower  0 so as to ensure that is condition is
met.
Two important technical notes are in order regarding this transfer scheme.
1. As specied, the tax scheme is not continously di¤erentiable, whereas to solve
the model we require it to be at least twice continously di¤erentiable, because
the second derivative of  () enters the optimal decision rule for investment uvt.
As a result, we use a smooth approximation to the above "jumping" transfer
scheme. In practice we use the following:
 (s) =  0 +  diff (sj1; &) (15)
where  (sj1; &) is the cumulative distribution function of the normal distribu-
tion with mean one and standard deviation &. The balanced budget condition
14 must be modied accordingly:Z 1
0
[ 0 +  diff (sj1; &)  1]uvtdv = 0 (16)
The key to ensuring (14) and (16) are similar is to set & to a small value, so that
the transition between tax rates  0 and  0 +  diff is rapid. We set & = 0:001,
which implies that capital of vintage two days less than a year is taxed at a rate
negligibly di¤erent from  0, and that capital of vintage two days more than a
year is taxed at a rate negligibly di¤erent from  0 +  diff .
2. For a given value of  diff 6= 0, it is not necessarily the case that there exists
a value of  0 that satises the balanced budget condition (16). For example,
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if the relative subsidy  diff is very large, the subsidy on young capital may be
so much that it cannot be nanced only through taxing old capital of which
there may be little, especially if  is high so capital of di¤erent vintages are
very good substitutes. As vintages become perfect substitutes ( ! 1) then
small tax di¤erentials between di¤erent vintages will result in huge di¤erences
in investment patterns, so that practically all investment is directed towards
the subsidized vintages, so that government budget balance is not possible for
su¢ ciently large values of  diff . Still, we are interested in schemes that do
satisfy these properties are of interest because they allow us to understand the
impact of distortions to the vintage distribution in a controlled environment.
What is the impact of such a tax scheme on di¤usion patterns? Proposition 2
indicates that optimal investment uvt is a¤ected by the structure of the tax system.
With the tax system denedn by equation (15), when investment tax rates jump
up or jump down around age 1, investment patterns may change suddenly. When
 diff > 0 (so new vintages are taxed less) Figure 3 shows that investment drops
o¤ in general for vintages older than 1. Close to 1, there is a spike as the tax rate
accelerates from  0 towards  0 +  diff , as it is more protable to invest in those
vintages than in other vintages that are similar technologically but very di¤erent
for tax purposes. This is followed by a sharp drop as the tax rate slows down and
approaches  0 +  diff . In contrast, when  diff < 0 (so new vintages are taxed more),
Figure 3 shows that investment rises in general for vintages older than 1. Close to
1, there is a sharp drop as the tax rate declines from  0 towards  0 +  diff , followed
21
by a sharp rise as the tax rate settles down and approaches  0 +  diff .
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Figure 3 Investment uvt by age when capital with v under 1 is taxed di¤erentially from
capital with v above 1. In the top panel old capital is taxed more ( diff = 0:3) . In the
lower panel new capital is taxed more ( diff =  0:3) .
As mentioned, separately, we also examine policies that are designed to keep
investment constant. In these experiments given a value of  diff , we select  0 so that
investment equals 18:5 percent of GDP as in the benchmark economy. In this case
we will have that Z 1
0
[ 0 +  diff (sj1; &)  1]uvtdv = Tt, Tt ? 0. (17)
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The point of this experiment is to demonstrate that results for the other type of
policy are not primarily due to the aggregate impact of changes in investment rates:
they are due to distortions in the vintage structure. Indeed results turn out to be
very similar as the required values of Tt are small. Again, it is not the case that
for any particular value of  diff it is possible to nd a transfer scheme that satises
these properties.
4.3 Results
Before anything, it is not necessarily the case that the steady state impact of taxes
and transfers is negative even though the usual welfare theorems apply to the model
economy. The reason is simple: we are comparing across steady state economies,
which have di¤erent initial values of kv;0, v < 0. The welfare theorems apply to the
model economy with a given initial condition kv;0. Nonetheless, as we shall see, there
does not appear to be much scope for increasing long run welfare through intra-
vintage transfers. In general it is not clear whether subsidizing the new is going to
increase or decrease long-run welfare, since new capital is less productive in the sense
of learning but more productive in terms of , and learning is rapid. We measure
welfare changes using the percentage change (relative to the calibrated benchmark) in
the level of consumption in each period, similar to a dynamic compensating variation.
Figure 4 shows that subsidizing the new (a negative tax di¤erential) actually
decreases welfare in the calibrated economy. A 20 percent subsidy on investment in
the newest vintages (conditional on overall transfers to capital being zero), leads to
a decline in consumption in each period of 1 percent. The impact of such transfers is
non-linear: a 50 percent subsidy lowers consumption by 5 percent, and a 100 percent
subsidy lowers consumption by fully 18 percent. In contrast, a 50 percent tax on the
new (which is equivalent to a small subsidy to older capital) increases consumption in
each period by about 1 percent. These long-run gains increase with greater taxation
of the new, peaking around 1:5 percent when  diff = 300 percent (not shown in
Figure 4) and then fading gradually: at this point, there is very little investment in
new capital because of the onerous taxation.
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Figure 4 Impact of inter-vintage transfer systems. The x-axis in each
case is the percent tax premium on capital of vintage over one year,  diff .
The gure and all gures below assume that there are no net transfers to
capital unless otherwise indicated.
Interestingly, Figure 4 shows that the impact of vintage-specic taxation on over-
all investment is not signicant. Varying  diff between  100 percent and +100 per-
cent decreases investment from about 21 percent of GDP down to about 18 percent
(the baseline value is 18:5 percent). On the other hand, the share of investment
devoted to investment of the newest vintage (again, dened as the newest year of
vintages) varies signicantly, from about 40 percent down to almost zero (compared
to the baseline value of 5:7 percent). This suggests that it is the distortions to the
vintage structure not changes in aggregate investment that are responsible for
the results.
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This is conrmed in Figure 5. Figure 5 reports results for transfer systems where
 0 and therefore Tt are chosen so as to keep aggregate investment constant. The
results concerning welfare as measured by detrended consumption, as well as GDP
and the share of investment in new vintages, are very similar. In addition, varying
 diff between  100 and +100 percent only entails net transfers to consumers from
the capital sector of +2 to  0:5 percent.
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Figure 5 Impact of inter-vintage transfer systems. The x-axis in each
case is the percent tax premium on capital of vintage over one year,  diff .
This Figure assumes that transfers are set so that investment is constant.
4.4 Robustness: the impact of learning
One might ask whether the negative impact of new vintage subsidies in Figure 4 is
because of the assumption that initial productivity of new capital is zero. To examine
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this question, we modify the learning function so that:
As = 1  e (s+s); s  0:
Allowing the parameter s > 0 is equivalent to assuming that investment in any vin-
tage of capital jumps from zero to a positive value when v = t. We set s = 1:4, which
is about the age that maximizes the investment ow in the baseline calibration. Fig-
ure 6 shows that allowing s > 0 can actually increase the macroeconomic impact of
vintage-specic transfers, although the di¤erence is not very large compared to the
baseline with s = 0. The upside remains small in the long run (around 2% of con-
sumption) but the downside can be even larger than before. This suggests that the
shape of the learning prole, while important for matching di¤usion curves, is not
critical for the policy implications of inter-vintage transfers: instead, the productiv-
ity di¤erences between vintages, and the di¢ culty of substituting between di¤erent
vintages, are important.
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Figure 6 Impact of inter-vintage transfer systems. The x-axis in each
case is the percent tax premium on capital of vintage over one year,  diff .
Assumes initial learning A0 is positive: As = 1  e (s+s) and s  0.
4.5 Robustness: the impact of embodiment
In the model there are two reasons why inter-vintage transfers might have aggregate
impact. One is the fact that the vintages have di¤erent productivity. The other
is that they are simply imperfect substitutes. To see whether embodiment (rather
than substitution alone) is important we perform two exercises. First, in Figure 7
we repeat the experiments with a low value of . Second, in Figure 8 we raise the
elasticity of substitution  to a larger value.
Figure 7 distinguishes between the impact of embodiment and the impact of
substitution among vintages by assuming  is small. When  = 0:001, compared to
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the calibrated value of  = 0:018, the impact of taxation on long-run consumption
declines by more than half. For example, whereas a 100 percent subsidy to new
vintages lowers consumption by 18 percent, when  is small consumption declines
by only about 8 percent. Thus it is not just the fact that old and new capital are
not perfect substitues that a¤ects the results: the rate of capital embodied technical
progress is a key determinant of the results.
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Figure 7 Impact of inter-vintage transfer systems. The x-axis in each
case is the percent tax premium on capital of vintage over one year,  diff .
Assumes  equals 0:001.
Next, Figure 8 shows the results for  = 4, to examine the sensitivity of results to
the inter-vintage elasticity of substitution. When  diff = 50%, consumption drops
relative to the untaxed economy by about 11 percent. In contrast, in the baseline
scenario with  = 2 a tax di¤erential  diff = 50% leads consumption to drop relative
to the untaxed economy by about 5 percent. When  = 4, di¤erent vintages are
28
more substitutable, so a given tax di¤erential leads to more drastic di¤erences in
investment patterns, which then interact more strongly with vintage productivity
di¤erences. In this sense, our benchmark assumption that  = 2 is conservative.
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Figure 8 Impact of inter-vintage transfer systems. The x-axis in each
case is the percent tax premium on capital of vintage over one year,  diff .
The thick line assumes  equals 4 and the dotted line assumes that 
equals 2 as in the benchmark calibration. Tax di¤erentials  diff smaller than
minus 50 percent do not satisfy the balanced budget condition (16)
when  equals 4 so they are not displayed.
Finally we also check the sensitivity of results to interpreting capitalKt as includ-
ing not just physical capital but also whatever resource embodies the learning As.
See Figure 9, where we assume that s = 0 as in the baseline economy, but raise the
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capital share to  = 0:5. In this case the impact of inter-vintage transfers is larger,
as might be expected, since capital (and hence distortions to capital) are more im-
portant for output and consumption when  is large. Whereas  diff =  100 percent
led to a decline in long-run consumption of 18 percent in the baseline economy with
 = 0:33, when  = 0:5 consumption declines by 34 percent.
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Figure 9 Impact of inter-vintage transfer systems. The x-axis in each
case is the percent tax premium on capital of vintage over one year,  diff .
Assumes  equals 0:5.
5 Concluding remarks
The paper nds that policy-based distortions to the vintage distribution of capital can
have signicant aggregate and welfare impact. The results provide a clear response
to a central argument in the embodiment controversy that the usefulness of models
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where technical progress is embodied in capital hinges on their policy-relevance. They
also indicate a new channel for policy, market frictions or other distortions to a¤ect
the wealth of nations a channel that can only be addressed using a model where
technical progress is embodied in capital.
The paper strictly focuses on the impact of policy through the vintage distri-
bution. We do not mean to suggest that there are not channels other than the
vintage distribution through which policy might a¤ect aggregates which relate to
environments where technology is embodied in capital. One possibility is the fact,
documented in Cummins and Violante (2002), that di¤erences in rates of technology
improvement vary across capital goods. Thus, changes in the composition of capital
not the vintage distribution, but the type distribution could matter too. There
could also be interactions between regulation and vintage capital through rm dy-
namics, as suggested by Samaniego (2006a, 2006b, 2010), which could be propagated
through the choice of vintage. These questions remains for future work.
Another channel from which we abstract is a potential interaction with vintage-
specic human capital, or with the skill composition of the economy, as suggested
by Chari and Hopenhayn (1991). Extending the model to allow vintage physical and
vintage human capital accumulation to interact would likely amplify the results of
the paper.
We do not study the distinction between used and new capital of a given vin-
tage. This distinction could matter in an environment where there is a concept of
reallocation among production units, and where there might be costs of reallocation.
Lanteri (2016) studies such reallocation but in an environment without a vintage
model. Eisfeldt and Rampini (2007) nd that used capital is important for the oper-
ation of credit constrained rms, suggesting that changes in the vintage distribution
could be important for the aggregate impact of nancing frictions.Also, given the
large potential impact of distortions to the vintage distribution identied in this pa-
per, it may be important to evaluate whether the fact that imports of used capital
goods are restricted or prohibited in developing economies is o¤set by the costs of
ensuring that quality used goods of older vintage might be smoothly imported.
Finally, the model implies that vintage-specic taxation could inuence capital
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prices or investment patterns. For example, trading turnover in certain capital goods
is non-monotonic in vintage, as shown by Stolyarov (2002). It would be interesting
to explore whether the tax treatment of goods of di¤erent vintages, for example
di¤erences between the tax treatment of depreciation and actual physical or economic
depreciation patterns, could be responsible for non-monotonicity in resale or pricing
patterns of used or of old-vintage capital.
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A Proofs
Below are proofs for the results reported in the main text.
Proof of Proposition 1. The proof is a consequence of the results below, which
construct a unique stationary equilibrium for the model economy.
Proof of Proposition 2. In equilibrium Nt = 1 since labor does not enter
the utility function, and wt = (1  ) yt. Thus, the Lagrangian for the investment
problem is
L =
Z 1
0
e rt

Kt   xt (0) 
Z t
 1
 (t  v)uvtdv+ (18)
+
Z t
0
vt

e (t v)xv +
Z t
v
e (t s)uv;sds  kvt

dv (19)
+
Z 0
 1
vt

e (t v)kv0 +
Z t
0
e (t s)uv;sds  kvt

dv

dt (20)
Using small variations of the controls u; x; y; k, we have
L 
Z 1
0
e rt

yt   xt (0) 
Z t
 1
 (t  v) uvtdv (21)
+
Z t
0
vt
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0
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 dv
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we have that:
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Then
L 
Z 1
0
e rt

yt   xt (0) 
Z t
 1
 (t  v) uvtdv

dt (24)
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Z 1
0
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Z t
0
vt

e (t v)xv +
Z t
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e (t s)uv;sds  kvt

dvdt (25)
+
Z 1
0
e rt
Z 0
 1
vt
Z t
0
e (t s)uv;sds  kvt

dvdt (26)
then
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Z 1
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e rt fxt (0)g dt (27)
+
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 
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 1
 (t  v) uvtdv

dt (28)
+
Z 1
0
e rt
Z t
 1
vt
Z t
v
e (t s)uv;sds

dvdt (29)
+
Z 1
0
e rt

y
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t
Z t
 1
At vzv k
 1
vt kvtdv

dt (30)
+
Z 1
0
e rt
Z t
 1
vt [ kvt] dvdt (31)
Switching the integrals and rearranging (see Hritonenko and Yatsenko (1996, 2005)),
L 
Z 1
0
Z 1
t
e rs (s t)tsds  e rt (0)

xtdt (32)
+
Z 1
0
Z t
 1
Z 1
t
e rs (s t)vsds  e rt (t  v)

uvtdvdt (33)
+
Z 1
0
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 1
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
y
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
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Setting the coe¤s of  to zero yields the following optimality conditions:Z 1
t
e rs (s t)tsds = e rt (0) ;8t (35)Z 1
t
e rs (s t)vsds = e rt (t  v) ;8t; v (36)
y
 

t At vz

v k
 1
vt = vt;8t; v (37)
Thus, optimally investment is chosen so that
zv
Z 1
t
e (r+)sy
 

s As vk 1vs ds = e
 (r+)t (t  v)
Notice this is the same as the solution for JY13 except that bzv = zv = (t  v).
Di¤erentiating this condition wrt t yields
zv y
 

t At vk
 1
vt = (r + )  (t  v)   0 (t  v) :
where  0 (s) is the derivative of the tax system, and  0 (0) = lims!0+  0 (s).
Proof of Propositions 3 and 4. We use some proportionality relationships
regarding how aggregate variables must grow in a stationary equilibrium, in order to
derive further results regarding optimal investment. Recall that:
zv = e
v
The optimal growth rate of consumption given the utility function (1) is:
g =
r   

The fraction of investment in GDP is constant, and Kt grows at the rate + g. This
implies as in typical models with capital-embodied technical progress that:
g =

1  
Now consider that y
 

t / egt
 
 , and zv / ev = e
1 

gv. Since gt 

+ 1 

gv =
37
(1  ) gt   (t  v) we have that (conjecture
kvt =
0@ zv y  t At v
(r + )  (t  v)   0 (t  v)
1A 11 
=
0@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0 y 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1A 11 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0 e 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! 1
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 

0
 1
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, z0 = 1
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(38)
this becomes
k =
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y
 

0
 1
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 Z 0
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 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and then
k =
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 Z 0
 1
A v

eg00 v
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 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Rearranging we end up with:
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 1
1 
264Z 1
0
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24 e 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r+
! 1
1 
35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Next we turn to the calculation of optimal investment. For new capital,
xt = ktt = e
gt0 = e
gtk
 
A0
 (0)   0(0)
(r+)
! 1
1 
which will be a constant fraction of GDP. For old capital, the capital accumulation
equation (4) and the above derivations imply that
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
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@t v
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
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we have that
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So uvt = egtt v where
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Proof of Proposition 5. When  (s) =  , the tax and its derivative cancel out of
both the numerator and denominator of the vintage distribution in equation (13):
k^s =
e
  
1  sA
1
1 
s
(s)   0(s)
(r+)R1
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
e
  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du
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1
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s
R1
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e
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u


du
: (39)
Proof of Corollary 1. It is straightforward to show that k^s = e
  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sA
1
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,
so the value of  is irrelevant for k^s.
Proof of Proposition 6. The distribution of capital vintages is
k^s =
e 
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se
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 e !sR1
0
h
e 
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ue
u
1  e !u
i
du
Then assuming     + ! (1  ) > 0 this reduces to
k^s =


1    

1   + !

e [

1    1 +!]s:
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B Computational procedure
We compute the model economy with and without taxation by means of quadrature
approximation. Functions such as uvt and kvt are dened continuously. Then each
integral required to compute Kt or yt is evaluated using quadrature approximation
by evaluating these functions at small time intervals up to some date T . The date
T = 1000 years was chosen so that vintages v  T would be negligible in the
production function. The time interval was chosen to be small. Results are reported
using 100 time intervals per year: using 1000 time intervals per year did not change
the results at a precision of 6 signicant gures.
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